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I. Introduction 
Many policy makers want to encourage entrepreneurship given its perceived role in economic 
growth and development.
1 The importance of this factor has led to extensive recent research on 
regional traits associated with entrepreneurship. Multiple studies consider advanced economies, 
but there is very little empirical evidence for developing countries. This lack of research hampers 
the effectiveness of policy: for example, the roles that education or infrastructure play in entry in 
the U.S. may be quite different from a setting where illiteracy and lack of roads and sanitation 
continue to hamper development.  
Audretsch et al. (2012) emphasize the local nature of entrepreneurship determinants. We 
investigate these questions for manufacturing and services in India. Within these two industry 
groups, we also compare the organized and unorganized sectors. We quantify the traits of 
districts that systematically predict stronger entry levels. Several important themes emerge from 
our study. First, education levels and local infrastructure access are the most prominent local 
traits linked to entrepreneurship across all sectors. Second, local industrial conditions—the links 
that form across industries within a district—play an even stronger role in predicting entry within 
specific district-industries than the general district-level traits. Finally, in comparison to the U.S., 
we find that India‘s economic geography is still taking shape. At such an early point and with 
industrial structures not entrenched, there is room for policy to have substantial impact by shaping 
where industries plant their roots.  
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. We are among the first studies to 
quantify the spatial determinants of entrepreneurship in India. Moreover, we move beyond 
manufacturing to consider services, and we compare the organized and unorganized sectors. The 
latter analyses of the unorganized sector are among our most important contributions given the 
limited study of the informal economy previously and its substantial importance for India and 
other developing economies. More broadly, we are among the first studies to apply the 
incumbent industrial structures frameworks of Glaeser and Kerr (2009) to a developing 
economy, providing insights into how agglomeration economies resemble and differ from each 
other. More research on agglomeration economies and entrepreneurship in developing countries 
is important for urban and development economics going forward.
2 
                                                 
1 High rates of local entrepreneurship are linked to stronger subsequent job growth for regions in several 
countries (e.g., Fritsch 2008, Ghani et al. 2011, Glaeser et al. 2012). Mueller et al. (2008) caution, however, about 
sweeping statements given the substantial heterogeneity in the British experience, where job growth of regions 
depended strongly on the types of entrepreneurs entering and the initial conditions of the regions. Baumol (1990) 
also highlights how the positive or negative role of entrepreneurship depends upon the incentives in society. 
2 In contemporaneous work, Mukim (2011) examines spatial entry patterns for India‘s unorganized sector. 
Our working paper discusses similarities and differences between our studies. Other related work includes Drucker 3 
 
Identifying local conditions that encourage entrepreneurship and acting upon them is 
essential to foster economic growth. Figure 1 shows that entrepreneurship rates are lower in 
South Asia than what its stage of development would suggest. Effective entrepreneurship will 
play a key role in job growth for India, the development of a strong manufacturing base 
(Fernandes and Pakes 2010), and the transition of people out of subsistence living and the 
informal sector. Khanna (2008) emphasizes entrepreneurship for India‘s future, and reallocation 
can help close India‘s productivity gap (e.g., Hsieh and Klenow 2009).
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II. Spatial Entrepreneurship Rates in India 
We measure entrepreneurship as the presence of young establishments. Our primary measure, 
which we can consistently observe across all of our datasets, is whether an establishment is less 
than three years old. For the organized manufacturing sector, we can also measure 
establishments in their first year of existence, and we find very similar results with this approach. 
Incumbent establishments, which are used to model existing activity in the district-industry, are 
firms that are three years old or more. We principally define entry measures through employment 
in young establishments, and we look at counts of entering establishments in robustness checks.
4  
We employ establishment-level surveys of manufacturing and service enterprises carried 
out by the Government of India. Our manufacturing data are taken from surveys conducted in 
fiscal years 2005-06; services sector data come from 2001-02. While these surveys were 
conducted over two fiscal years, we refer below to the initial year only. An unpublished 
appendix is available from the authors upon request. This appendix lists data sources and years 
employed, and we describe below additional information included in this appendix. Nataraj 
(2009), Kathuria et al. (2010), Hasan and Jandoc (2010), and Dehejia and Panagariya (2010) 
provide detailed overviews of similar databases. 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Feser (2007, 2012), Acs and Varga (2005), Ardagna and Lusardi (2008), Rosenthal and Strange (2010), Delgado 
et al. (2010), and Calá et al. (2013).  
3 Parker (2009a) provides a complete review of the entrepreneurship literature, and Storey (1994) and 
Storey and Greene (2010) give an overview of small businesses and their connections to entrepreneurship 
specifically. Deichmann et al. (2008) survey prior work on firm locations in developing economies.  
4 Our data combine single-unit start-ups with expansion facilities of multi-unit firms. We can, to some 
degree, separate entry of multi-unit firms within organized manufacturing, although this distinction is not 
comprehensively available for all plants. With the splits available, we find very similar results when modeling 
single-unit entry rates. These splits are not possible for the unorganized sectors and services. A major development 
limitation for India is the growth and replication of successful initial businesses (e.g., Hsieh and Klenow 2009). 
From this perspective, many policy makers are equally concerned about encouraging entry of expansion 
establishments. Our working paper provides an extended discussion about our measures of entrepreneurship and 
alternative approaches. We also return to this discussion when considering the entrant size distribution. 4 
 
The distinction between organized and unorganized sectors relate to establishment size. 
In manufacturing, the organized sector is comprised of establishments with more than ten 
workers if the establishment uses electricity. If the establishment does not use electricity, the 
threshold is 20 workers or more. These establishments are required to register under the 
Factories Act of 1948. The unorganized manufacturing sector is, by default, comprised of 
establishments which fall outside the scope of the Factories Act.   
Service establishments, regardless of size or other characteristics, are not required to 
register and thus are all officially unorganized. There are various approaches to comparably 
differentiate small-scale, autonomous establishments from the larger employers that constitute 
the organized sector, as generally defined. We assign services establishments with fewer than 
five workers and/or listed as an ―own-account enterprise‖ (OAE) to the unorganized sector. OAE 
enterprises are firms that do not employ any hired worker on a regular basis. The choice of five 
employees as the size cutoff recognizes that average establishment size in services is 
significantly smaller than in manufacturing. Using this demarcation, the organized sector makes 
up approximately 25% of employment in both manufacturing and services. 
The organized manufacturing sector is surveyed by the Central Statistical Organisation 
(CSO) every year through the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), while unorganized 
manufacturing and services establishments are separately surveyed by the National Sample 
Survey Organisation (NSSO) at approximately five-year intervals. Establishments are surveyed 
with state and four-digit National Industry Classification (NIC) stratification. For organized 
manufacturing, the business register described above forms the basis for the sampling frame. 
Establishments are notified if they fall into the sampled frame and are required by law to 
complete and return the survey questionnaire, and the CSO investigates cases of non-response 
(typically closed plants). For the services and unorganized manufacturing sector, India‘s 
Economic Census comprises the basis for the sampling frame and stratification procedures. 
Establishments falling into the sample are then surveyed by government enumerators.
5 
The survey years we use are the most recent data by sector for which the young 
establishment identifiers are recorded. We use the provided sample weights to construct 
population-level estimates of total establishments and employment by district and three-digit 
NIC industry. Employment is formally defined as ―persons engaged‖ and includes working 
owners, family and casual labor, and salaried employees. 
                                                 
5 The sampling frame for the organized sector depends on the business register, and a concern might exist 
that firms indirectly sample out if they select a size so as to avoid registration. As we lack panel data, we are unable 
to take corrections like Disney et al. (2003). Absent a correlation with one of our explanatory variables, this 
measurement will primarily be for our outcome variables and thus not bias our estimates. With respect to the 
explanatory variables, we study the same covariates with the unorganized sector as well. We do not observe 
evidence of this type of gaming behavior when comparing results for the two sectors. 5 
 
Districts are administrative subdivisions of Indian states or territories. Currently there are 
approximately 630 districts spread across 35 states/union territories. We exclude districts with a 
population less than one million (based on 2001 census) or with fewer than 50 establishments 
sampled. We exclude these small districts because limited sampling makes the data of limited 
value for our study (given that we need to evaluate district-industry conditions that separate 
young and incumbent establishments). We also exclude states that experienced ongoing conflict 
and political turmoil during the period of study. After these adjustments, the resulting sample 
retains districts in 20 major states that include more than 94% of Indian employment in both 
manufacturing and services. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. Figures 2 and 3 show spatial entry patterns, and 
the appendix offers additional tabulations by state. Entry rates, as a weighted average across all 
states, are 15% and 12% for organized and unorganized manufacturing, respectively. The entry 
rate is 20% for organized services, and 17% for unorganized services. The spatial entry rates for 
organized and unorganized sectors have -0.2 and 0.3 correlations across states for manufacturing 
and services, respectively. van Stel et al. (2007) emphasize the need to measure entry 
determinants separately across different types of entrepreneurs. 
  
III. Determinants of Entrepreneurship 
We now describe the spatial and industrial factors that we use to predict entrepreneurship. We 
first consider general traits of the district that affect all entrepreneurs, regardless of industry. 
These traits include both baseline features that are long-standing and slow to adjust, like the 
population distribution, and factors that are more directly influenced by policy makers, such as 
education and infrastructure, recognizing that deep change in education and infrastructure also 
takes a long time to accomplish. Second, recent research stresses the central importance of 
heterogeneity across industries as well as regions for explaining start-up rates (e.g., Fritsch and 
Falck 2007, Glaeser and Kerr 2009). Our second category thus develops industry-specific 
conditions that yield this heterogeneity within regional experiences. 
District-Level Conditions 
Our initial explanatory measures focus on basic traits of districts. It is essential to understand the 
effect of local area traits on entrepreneurship, especially given the disproportionate degree to 
which entrepreneurs found businesses in their home areas (e.g., Figueiredo et al. 2002, 
Michelacci and Silva 2007). We first control for population to provide a natural baseline of 
economic activity (e.g., consumer markets, general availability of workers). We next consider 
the district‘s age structure, measured as the ratio of working age population to non-working age 
population, given that the propensity to start new firms changes over the lifetimes of individuals, 6 
 
and the age structure of a region often connects to local entry rates (e.g., Bönte et al. 2009, 
Delfmann et al. 2013). The age profile is often called the demographic dividend in the Indian 
context. 
Third, we include a measure of population density. Unlike the clear positive predictions 
for the first two factors, the prediction for population density is ambiguous as it brings higher 
wages and land rents alongside greater market opportunities. Density has also been linked to 
stronger knowledge flows, and Audretsch and Fritsch (1994) use density as one source of 
convexity in local production that links to entry rates. Many studies link higher population 
density to reduced manufacturing entry rates, especially for larger plants that use established 
production techniques and seek to minimize costs. Duranton and Puga (2001) provide a formal 
theoretical model of this process. Ultimately, these multiple forces suggest an uncertain 
theoretical role for population density in explaining Indian entry rates. 
Beyond these basic demographics, we consider five primary traits of districts: education 
of the local labor force, quality of local physical infrastructure, access or travel time to major 
Indian cities, stringency of labor laws, and household banking conditions. These traits are 
motivated by theoretical models of entrepreneurship and perceived importance to India‘s 
development, and we discuss other traits and their relationships to these variables below. Unless 
otherwise noted, these traits are taken from the 2001 Population Census. 
Several studies link entrepreneurship to educated workforces in the U.S. (e.g., Doms et 
al. 2010, Glaeser et al. 2010), often with the underlying conceptual model that entrepreneurship 
requires a degree of creativity and handling of many tasks and ambiguous circumstances that 
education prepares one for (e.g., the model of Lazear 2005). Entrepreneurs may also benefit from 
specific development of basic business skills. On the other hand, Reynolds et al. (1994) do not 
find this relationship holds within every country, and Glaeser and Kerr (2009) find limited 
evidence for a link of education to U.S. manufacturing entrepreneurship. Thus, the literature is 
again ambiguous. Clarifying education‘s role for India is very important, as many local policy 
makers stress developing the human capital of their workforces, and India is no different (Amin 
and Mattoo 2008). We measure the general education level of a district by the percentage of 
adults with a graduate (post-secondary) degree. Our results are robust to alternative definitions 
such as the percentage of adults with higher secondary education. 
Our second trait is the physical infrastructure level of the district. Basic services like 
electricity are essential for all businesses, but new entrants can be particularly dependent upon 
local infrastructure (e.g., established firms are better able to provision their own electricity if 
need be, which is quite common in India). Aghion et al. (2012) provide a recent theoretical 
model. Entrepreneurship is likely to benefit from greater infrastructure so long as the tax burden 
imposed to provide the infrastructure is not too high. Many observers cite upgrading India‘s 7 
 
infrastructure as a critical step towards economic growth, and the Indian government has set 
aside substantial investment funds. The population census documents the number of villages in a 
district with telecommunications access, electricity access, paved roads, and safe drinking water. 
We calculate the percentage of villages that have infrastructure access within a district and sum 
across the four measures to create a continuous composite metric that ranges from zero (no 
infrastructure access) to four (full access).  
India‘s economy is undergoing dramatic structural changes (Desmet et al. 2011). From a 
starting point in the 1980s when the government used licensing to promote industrial location in 
regions that were developing slowly, the economic geography of India has been in flux as firms 
and new entrants shift spatially (e.g., Fernandes and Sharma 2011). One feature that is important 
for a district in this transformation is its link to major cities. We thus include a measure from Lall 
et al. (2011) of the driving time to the nearest of India‘s ten largest cities as a measure of 
physical connectivity and across-district infrastructure.   
We next model local labor regulations using state-level policy variation. Several studies 
link labor regulations in India to slower economic progress (e.g., Besley and Burgess 2004, 
Aghion et al. 2008), and Bozkaya and Kerr (2013) provide a theory model where tighter labor 
laws suppress entry. This effect may occur through reduced likelihood of wanting to start a new 
firm, or through reduced likelihood of opening new facilities from a desire to avoid regulations. 
There may also be reduced ‗push‘ into entrepreneurship with more protected employment 
positions. We create a composite labor regulations index by state from the measures constructed 
by Ahsan and Pages (2007). 
The final measure is the strength of household banking environment, reflecting the large 
literature on financial constraints and entrepreneurship, with Evans and Jovanovic (1989) being a 
seminal model. We measure the percentage of households that have banking services by district. 
This measure is likely to be particularly reflective of financing environments for unorganized 
sector activity.  
Local Industrial Traits 
Recent research emphasizes how local entrepreneurship varies substantially across industries, 
and our second set of metrics quantifies how suitable the local industrial environment is for a 
particular industry. Our first trait is the overall employment in a district-industry for incumbent 
firms. This is important given that entrepreneurs often leave incumbents to start their companies 
(e.g., Klepper 2010, Falck et al. 2008).  From this baseline, we further develop metrics that unite 
the broad distribution of industry employments in districts with the extent to which industries 
interact through the traditional agglomeration rationales (e.g., Marshall 1920, Duranton and Puga 
2004, Rosenthal and Strange 2004). We consider these forces within the manufacturing sector, 8 
 
and we model these conditions through incumbent firms that pre-date the birth of the young 
businesses that we model in our outcome variables.
6  
The first agglomeration rationale is that proximity to customers and suppliers reduces 
transportation costs and thereby increases productivity. This reduction in shipping costs is the 
core agglomerative force of the New Economic Geography theory (e.g., Fujita et al. 1999). 
Where customers and suppliers are geographically separate, firms trade off distances. We 
measure the extent to which districts contain potential customers and suppliers for a new 
entrepreneur. We begin with an input-output table for India developed by the CSO. We define 
Inputi←k as the share of industry i's inputs that come from industry k, and Outputi→k as the share 
of industry i's outputs that go to industry k. These measures run from zero (no input or output 
purchasing relationship exists) to one (full dependency on the paired industry).   
We summarize the quality of a district d in terms of its input flows for an industry i as 
Inputdi = - ∑k=1,...,I abs(Inputi←k – Edk/Ed), where I indexes industries. This measure aggregates 
absolute deviations between the proportions of industrial inputs required by industry i and 
district d's actual industrial composition, with E representing employment. The measure is 
mostly orthogonal to district size, which we separately consider, and a negative value is taken so 
that the metric ranges between negative two (i.e., no inputs available) and zero (i.e., all inputs are 
available in the local market in precise proportions). This metric assumes that firms have limited 
ability to substitute across material inputs in their production processes. 
To capture the relative strength of output relationships, we also define a consolidated 
metric Outputdi = ∑k=1,...,I Edk/Ed∙Outputi→k. This metric multiplies the national share of industry 
i's output sales that go to industry k with the fraction of industry k's employment in district d. By 
summing across industries, we take a weighted average of the strength of local industrial sales 
opportunities for industry i in the focal market d. This Outputdi measure takes on higher values 
with greater sales opportunities. This output measure allows greater substitution across customer 
industries than the design built into the input metric, and we have tested its robustness to several 
design variants. 
Moving from material inputs, entrepreneurship is quite likely to be driven by the 
availability of a suitable labor force (e.g., the model of Combes and Duranton 2006). While 
education and demographics are informative about the suitability of the local labor force, these 
aggregate traits miss the very specialized nature of many occupations. Our working paper 
summarizes theories as to why specialized workers and firms agglomerate together and provides 
extended references. Unlike studies of advanced economies, India lacks the data to model direct 
occupational flows between industries. Greenstone et al. (2010) calculate from the Current 
                                                 
6 This approach is used by Glaeser and Kerr (2009), Jofre-Monseny et al. (2011), Dauth (2011), and Mukim 
(2011). It follows upon the coagglomeration work of Ellison et al. (2010). 9 
 
Population Survey the rate at which workers move between industries in the U.S. Using their 
measure of labor similarity for two industries, we define Labordi=∑k=1,...,I Edk/Ed∙Mobilityi←k. This 
metric is a weighted average of the labor similarity of industries to the focal industry i, with the 
weights being each industry‘s share of employment in the local district. The metric is again by 
construction mostly orthogonal to district size. 
These metrics condense large and diverse industrial structures for cities into manageable 
statistics of local industrial conditions. The advantages and limitations in their design are further 
discussed in our working paper. Perhaps the most important issue is that these district conditions 
do not capture interactions with neighboring districts, but factor and product markets can be 
wider than a local area. The average size of an Indian district is about the same as two U.S. 
counties at 5,500 square kilometers. 
We finally turn to a special issue regarding local firm size distribution, building upon a 
literature that traces back to at least Johnson and Cathcart (1979). Fritsch and Falck (2007) and 
Parker (2009b) emphasize the strong degree to which an industrial base populated with small 
firms is associated with higher entrepreneurship rates. Fritsch and Falck (2007) note that the 
relationship could descend from a greater entrepreneurial culture
7, better training for 
entrepreneurs due to having worked in small businesses, or perhaps a reflection of the local 
industry‘s minimum efficient plant size. Parker (2009b) emphasizes a self-selection role by 
entrepreneurs. For the organized manufacturing sector, we test the inclusion of a measure of the 
local small firm share (<40 employees) in estimations. While there are many reasons to believe 
this pattern in advanced countries will carry over to India, there are also reasons to be doubtful. 
For example, Indian labor laws and size regulations have long suppressed average firm size in 
India compared to its peers, perhaps weakening this robust relationship evident elsewhere. 
We also measure a specific variant of this effect related to customer/supplier industries. 
Chinitz (1961) observed that entrepreneurs often find it difficult to work with large, vertically-
integrated suppliers. The entrepreneur‘s order sizes are too small, and often the entrepreneur‘s 
needs are non-standard. Empirical studies for the U.S. find the Chinitz effect very important in 
local start-up conditions. We quantify the Chinitz effect—as distinct from the general conditions 
captured in Inputdi—through a metric that essentially calculates the average firm size in a district 
in industries that typically supply a given industry i: Chinitzdi=∑k=1,...,I Firmsdk/Ed∙ Inputi←k. 
Higher values of the Chinitzdi metric indicate better supplier conditions for entrepreneurs.  
 
                                                 
7 See Hofstede (2001), Boschma and Fritsch (2007), and Falck et al. (2011). Culture and social capital 
aspects are taken up by Fritsch and Wyrwich (2013), Kibler et al. (2013), and Westlund et al. (2013). 10 
 
IV. Estimation Approach 
We characterize factors related to entry through cross-sectional regressions at the district-
industry level of India. This level of variation allows us to analyze both district-level 
determinants and the underlying heterogeneity for entrants across industries due to incumbent 
industrial structures. Following the above literature and conceptual notes, these specifications 
take the form 
ln(Entrydi) = ηi + β∙Xd + γ∙Zdi + εdi. 
The dependent variable is the log measure of entry employment by district-industry. Our sample 
includes the district-industry observations in which positive incumbent employment exists. The 
observation count thus differs across manufacturing and services and for organized and 
unorganized sectors. Many of our explanatory variables, such as incumbent district-industry 
employment, are also in log values so that the coefficients estimate proportionate responses. We 
transform non-log variables to have unit standard deviation for interpretation, weight estimations 
by an interaction of log industry size with log district population, and cluster standard errors by 
district to reflect the multiple mappings of district-level variables across local industries.
8 
We include a vector of industry fixed effects ηi in estimations. These fixed effects control 
for systematic differences across industries in their entrepreneurship rates, competition levels, 
average plant sizes, and similar. As Fritsch and Falck (2007) demonstrate, isolating spatial 
variations from these industry-level traits is very important. Also, our metrics of local industrial 
conditions utilize both fixed traits of industries (e.g., the input-output relationships, labor flows) 
and the distribution of industries within a district. The inclusion of industry fixed effects controls 
for these fixed industry-level traits except to the extent that they interact with the local industrial 
structure.  
The vectors Xd and Zdi contain district and district-industry traits, respectively. Our 
estimation approach balances several objectives. First, given that there has been so little work on 
India, we seek to provide a sufficiently broad analysis to highlight where major correlations lie in 
the data. In doing so, we do not want to be too parsimonious in our specifications, but we also do 
not want to overload the analysis. Our set of metrics provides a good depiction of the Indian 
entrepreneurial landscape, motivated by theory, and we discuss in the robustness section and 
appendix the many additional factors we considered when forming this baseline. 
                                                 
8 We recode a value of less than one entering employee on average as one entering employee. This 
maintains a consistent sample size, and the distinction between zero and one employee for a district-industry is not 
economically meaningful. These cells can be excluded without impacting our results. 11 
 
We emphasize that this work measures partial correlations in the data, rather than causal 
parameters, reflective of our initial inquiry. In all cases, local traits are pre-determined for the 
entrepreneurship that we measure as the outcome variable. This provides some confidence 
against reverse causality, and we further test including lagged entry rates as a control variable. A 
second concern is omitted factors that are highly correlated with our regressors, making 
interpretation difficult. For example, in our baseline model, education may capture the quality of 
the local workforce that entrepreneurs employ, the strength of the local pool of potential 
entrepreneurs, and/or stronger local consumer demand. We provide some specific checks along 
these lines (e.g., controlling for consumption per capita), but there will be a natural limit against 
checking every feasible concern. We further discuss these issues below.  
 
V. Empirical Results 
Table 2A considers organized manufacturing. Column 1 includes just district populations, 
district-industry employments, and industry fixed effects. The existing district-industry 
employment strongly shapes the spatial location of entry: a 10% increase in incumbent 
employment raises entry employment by around 2%. In addition, a district‘s population increases 
entry rates with an elasticity of 0.5. Higher-order population terms are not found to be 
statistically significant or economically important. The adjusted R-Squared value for this 
estimation is quite modest at 0.13.  
It is useful to compare these results to those evident in the U.S. for two reasons. First, the 
U.S.‘s advanced economy—and policy environment that has relatively fewer distortions—
provides a useful idea of what entrepreneurship and local conditions might look like at the 
frontier. This is not to say that India will necessarily look like the U.S. when it reaches current 
levels of U.S. development, just as entrepreneurship rates differ across advanced economies 
today. Nevertheless, in terms of broad regularities, it is very helpful to compare the India 
statistics against a country like the U.S. to provide perspective. A very well-known example in 
this regard is the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) comparison of misallocation of production across 
plants in India and the U.S. Second, and from an academic perspective, we have a growing body 
of evidence and intuition on how the U.S. economy functions with respect to entrepreneurship. 
The extent to which our study can identify where the Indian experience resembles or differs from 
the U.S. experience provides a reasonable starting point for ascertaining which lessons from the 
U.S. studies can be applied to the Indian context. Our conclusions section describes some of 
these lessons that do or do not apply, and hopefully our paper provides a touchstone for 
identifying whether lessons from future studies made of the U.S. or other advanced economies 
should be taken into account when thinking about the Indian context. 12 
 
Glaeser and Kerr (2009) estimate a related specification for the U.S. that uses long-term 
employment for a city-industry as the key explanatory variable. If we adjust our estimation to 
more closely match their technique, we obtain an elasticity of 0.8 that is very similar to their 0.7 
elasticity. While this elasticity is comparable, the R-Squared value for this estimation remains 
quite modest at 0.29, much lower than the R-Squared value of 0.80 for Glaeser and Kerr (2009). 
There are likely several factors behind this lower explanatory power for India, including data 
differences, estimations at the district versus city level, and similar. These natural differences 
between the Indian and U.S. data limit perfect comparison, but we believe the datasets are 
sufficiently similar to make some basic inference. Most important, it is clear that many industries 
within India‘s manufacturing sector are at a much earlier development stage than those in the 
U.S., where the manufacturing sector is instead shrinking. Thus, while existing patterns of 
industrial activity explain the similarity of spatial distribution of entrepreneurship in India and 
the U.S., India has much more variation in outcomes, which we characterize further below. 
Fernandes and Sharma (2011) also study these variations with respect to policy deregulations. 
Kathuria (2011) provides a broader exploratory framework. 
Column 2 includes the district-level traits. Three factors stand out as discouraging 
entrepreneurship in organized manufacturing: high population density, strict labor regulations, 
and greater distance to one of India‘s ten biggest cities. The first pattern has been observed in 
many settings and reflects large manufacturers seeking cheaper environments. The second 
pattern connects with earlier studies of India that argue strict labor laws reduce economic 
growth. These policies are associated with reduced entry even after conditioning on district-
industry size. The final factor highlights that while manufacturers avoid the high costs of urban 
areas, they also avoid the most remote areas of India in favor of settings that are relatively near 
to large population centers, likely to access customers directly or to connect to shipping routes. 
On the other hand, the education of a district‘s workforce is linked to higher entry rates. The 
elasticity that is estimated here is stronger than that found in comparable U.S. estimations. 
The third column introduces district-industry traits. The roles of input and output markets 
are exceptionally strong with 0.4-0.5 elasticities. Both the labor market and Chinitz measures 
have positive coefficients. The decline in the main effect of incumbent employment suggests that 
these four new metrics capture the positive effects of local clusters on entry. The fourth column 
shows quite similar results if we further control for consumption per capita, per the discussion in 
the prior section. This control, along with the population metrics, suggests that demand side 
factors are not solely responsible for the positive roles that we see for metrics like education. 
Column 5 finds similar results when examining the log count of entering establishments, with the 
Chinitz metric being more prominent. We return to this difference when analyzing the entrant 
size distribution. 13 
 
Across these columns of Table 2A, the R-Squared value increases from 0.13 to almost 
0.3. While still modest, this growth in explanatory power due to modeling regional conditions is 
more substantial than that evident in Glaeser and Kerr (2009) for the U.S. This pattern highlights 
the greater relative importance of existing district conditions relative to incumbent positioning 
for explaining entrepreneurship in India, which we return to in the conclusions. 
Table 2B considers unorganized manufacturing, and several differences exist to Table 
2A. First, local population plays a much greater role, with approximately unit elasticity. 
Entrepreneurship in the unorganized sector is much more proportionate to local market sizes than 
in the organized sector. This theme is also evident in the independence of entry from local 
population density or travel time to a major city, the stronger relationship of entry to the age 
profile of the district, and the higher R-Squared values in Columns 1 and 2. Unorganized 
manufacturing clearly conforms much more closely to the overall contours of India‘s economic 
geography than organized manufacturing does. 
The other two district traits that are associated with strong entry rates are the strength of 
local, within-district physical infrastructure and the strength of local household banking 
environments. This contrasts with organized manufacturing entry, where education stands out. 
An intuitive explanation, which will also be reflected in the services estimations, is that these 
patterns and their differences reflect the factors on which each sector depends most. Organized 
manufacturing establishments have broader resources that reduce dependency on local 
infrastructure and household finance. Likewise, it is reasonable to believe that the unorganized 
sector depends less on educated workers than the organized sector. While intuitive, these results 
should be viewed as partial correlations until they can be rigorously confirmed in future research. 
We again find evidence for agglomeration economies within the unorganized 
manufacturing sector. The framework is similar to Table 2A except that we do not consider the 
Chinitz effect, since by definition the unorganized sector is comprised of small firms. Partly as a 
consequence of this, the inputs metric is relatively stronger in these estimations. The initial gap 
in explanatory power between the organized and unorganized sectors that was evident in the first 
two columns is diminished in the complete estimations in Columns 3-5. 
Table 3 considers organized and unorganized services entry. The contrast to organized 
manufacturing is again quite intriguing. First, overall district population is as important as it was 
for unorganized manufacturing, with elasticity greater than one. Similarly, the R-Squared value 
grows to 0.20 and 0.47 with just the parsimonious set of explanatory factors in Columns 1 and 5, 
respectively. The R-Squared value using the Glaeser and Kerr (2009) approach for organized 
services is 0.30. Also similar to unorganized manufacturing, population density and travel time 
to major cities are not important in the multivariate setting, while the district‘s age profile does 
contribute to higher entry levels. 14 
 
To recap, education and infrastructure matter the most among district traits. Education is 
generally more important, with particular relevance to organized sectors. Physical infrastructure 
has particular relevance to the unorganized sectors of the economy. The strength of the 
household banking sector is again also very important in the unorganized sectors of the 
economy. These channels provide three of the main ways that policy makers can influence the 
spatial distribution of entry. 
The role of the existing incumbent employment by district-industry for services is weak 
in Table 3, likely suggesting that Marshallian economies are weaker in services. Unreported 
estimations further model Marshallian interactions in the services sector similar to 
manufacturing. These results are also weak, at most suggesting a small role for labor market 
interactions. However, we hesitate to strongly interpret this difference as the weak results may be 
due to applying concepts and metrics originally designed for manufacturers to the service sector. 
Table 4 provides some extensions for organized manufacturing. Following the discussion 
in Section III, we first include in Column 1 the small firm incumbent share control. Including 
this control sharpens our earlier results further, including making the Chinitz effect more robust. 
We thus find evidence for the general small firm effects outline by Fritsch and Falck (2007) and 
Parker (2009b), as well as the Chinitz effect.  
Columns 2-5 of Table 4 break out entrants by their sizes, and Table 5 provides a broader 
depiction of the entrant size distribution. Starting with Table 5, Panel A presents the full entrant 
distribution that includes the organized and unorganized sectors. The complete distribution 
across both sectors looks broadly similar to other environments. For example, 98% of entering 
establishments have fewer than 10 employees, and only 0.09% of entering establishments have 
more than 100 workers. In terms of employment shares, 76% of employment in entering 
establishments is contained in establishments with fewer than ten employees, versus 9.5% in 
those entering with more than 100. Panel B isolates the organized sector, and within this group 
the largest entrant size category contains 5.5% of establishments and 53% of employment. The 
district-level variation is also consistent around these traits. 
Thus, the unorganized sector accounts for most entrants and employments, and includes 
plants that are by definition very small. The larger plants included in the organized sector are still 
skewed towards the smaller end of the size distribution (e.g., 79% have 10-19 employees) but the 
largest plants with more than 100 employees have 53% employment share. The definitions of 
entrants discussed in Section II highlight that our data include new firm formation, but also some 
elements of new establishments opening in a district. The former dominate the unorganized 
sector, given its small establishment sizes, while the latter become increasingly important in the 
larger size categories of the entrant size distribution for the organized sector. This makes a 15 
 
separation very useful, as household banking conditions, for example, may matter less for the 
organized sector than the labor laws present in India.  
Returning to Table 4, the heterogeneity across the entrant size distribution is fascinating 
and confirms many underlying theories and intuitions advanced earlier. Small entrants in the 
organized sector follow existing populations much more, similar to the unorganized sector 
(shown in Table 2b), while larger entrants in the organized sector are less tied to local demand 
and avoid places with high population density. The small business and Chinitz effects are much 
more important for small entrants in the organized sector, while labor markets and industrial 
output conditions are more critical for large entrants. Column 6 shows fairly similar results when 
using one-year entrants, with the main differences being greater emphasis on local banking 
conditions than local input markets. Column 7 likewise displays broadly similar results when 
instead controlling for lagged entry rates. 
The appendix provides additional robustness checks on these results: excluding sample 
weights, including additional covariates like the female population share and local religious 
affiliations (e.g., Mack et al. 2013), and clustering standard errors by state. We have also tested 
controls for a district‘s caste population (Iyer et al. 2011), conflict, trade levels, and general 
development levels (leading/lagging designations at the state and district level). These additional 
controls do not substantively affect the results presented, and we maintain the more parsimonious 
specification to mirror other work from outside of India. Our main specifications are also robust 
to controlling for incumbent firm counts or value added rather than employment. The appendix 
also provides additional work regarding the local industrial traits. We obtain similar results when 
we include district fixed effects in the estimations, or when we use changes in industrial 
conditions from 1989 to 2005 to partially address omitted variable bias concerns. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
Entrepreneurship can be an important factor for economic growth, and India has historically had 
low entry rates for the formation of new businesses. This condition is starting to improve, and 
further growth in effective entrepreneurship is an important stepping stone in India‘s continued 
development. This paper explores the spatial determinants of local entrepreneurship for Indian 
manufacturing and services. This analysis provides an important baseline for understanding what 
is important in India‘s developing economy, both as a first step for policy advice and as a guide 16 
 
to additional research efforts.
9 This foundation also serves a broader academic interest of 
comparing India‘s patterns with those of other economies like the U.S. 
At the district level, our strongest evidence points to the roles that local education levels 
and physical infrastructure quality play in promoting entry. We also find evidence that strict 
labor regulations discourage entrepreneurship, and better household banking environments are 
associated with higher entry in the unorganized sector. Policy makers wishing to encourage 
entrepreneurship in their local areas have several policy levers that can be exploited: investment 
in both people and places is an easy call for policy makers, while reducing unnecessary 
regulations and restrictions is also warranted. This raises the importance of correct policy design 
for local areas, and it provides a nice testing ground for future work on agglomeration and urban 
economies. In particular, further research surrounding the time dimensions to entrepreneurship‘s 
role in the local economy (e.g., Fritsch and Mueller 2004) for India might be particularly 
attractive given the rapid pace of the country‘s transformation. 
Research in regional science has also stressed the heterogeneity in entry across industries 
within a local area. We too find extensive evidence that the incumbent compositions of local 
industries influence new entry rates at the district-industry level within manufacturing. This 
influence is through traditional Marshallian agglomeration economies, the small firm effect that 
has been observed in many countries, and the Chinitz (1961) effect that emphasizes small 
suppliers. This evidence on localized agglomeration economies and entry is among the first in a 
developing economy of which we are aware.  
Moving to comparative reflections, the similarities between the patterns observed for 
India and those in the U.S. are surprisingly large. For example, we were surprised at the strength 
of the small firm and Chinitz effects, given that many accounts of India describe how its firm 
size distribution has been artificially compressed. One could imagine the positive channels for 
entrepreneurship described for advanced economies being greatly diminished when the size 
distribution is being partially set by the government. Yet, these patterns are comparable. This 
general comparability is very important as it suggests a substantial degree of portability in the 
insights we have derived in studying advanced economies (e.g., Chatterji et al. 2013) to 
developing and emerging situations.
10 
The differences in the patterns between India and the U.S. are also instructive and 
provide important caveats and boundaries on this portability. First, the role and importance of 
education and physical infrastructure are higher in India than in comparable U.S. studies. By 
                                                 
9 For example, Ghani et al. (2012) extend the distance to major city work by considering the development 
of the Golden Quadrangle highway system in India and its impact on districts (e.g., Datta 2011).  
10 Rosenthal and Strange (2013) and Ghani et al. (2013) identify similar features between the U.S. and India 
in the spatial sorting patterns of female entrepreneurs. 17 
 
contrast, other dimensions like population density and regional age structures behave very 
similarly. Our conjecture is that the spatial variation in the latter dimensions within India more 
closely resembles the variation in advanced economies, and so the same underlying economic 
forces operate comparably. On the other hand, many parts of India struggle with illiteracy and 
lack of paved roads, which are not issues that regional comparisons from the U.S. can provide 
insights on. So, the important nuance to the broad comparability and portability noted earlier is 
that researchers and policy makers need to carefully contemplate whether the variations utilized 
in earlier studies are reflective of the variations that they are dealing with. 
A second point of comparison with the U.S. is very striking. While coefficient elasticities 
are often similar in magnitude, a very striking difference between our work and that of Glaeser 
and Kerr (2009) is that we can generally only account for about a third of the spatial variation 
that the U.S.-focused study could. We posit that a large portion of this gap is due to India being 
at a much earlier stage of development, especially with the industrial landscape still adjusting to 
the deregulations of the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., Fernandes and Sharma 2011). District traits and 
local conditions take on a much greater importance, vis-à-vis incumbent employment 
distributions, with the economy in transition. At such an early point and with industrial structures 
not entrenched, local policies and traits can have profound and lasting impacts by shaping where 
industries plant their roots. These key differences between developing and advanced economies 
are worthy of further research.   18 
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District traits:
District population 2,972,828 1,731,997 3,207,232 1,021,573 13,900,000
District population density (persons per sq. km.) 810 2,477 480 35 24,963
Share of population with a graduate education 5.9% 2.7% 6.2% 1.7% 19.3%
Demographic dividend for a district (age profile) 1.32 0.26 1.41 0.92 2.12
Index of infrastructure quality for district 2.93 0.76 3.34 0.00 4.00
Strength of household banking environment 0.35 0.13 0.38 0.09 0.73
Stringency of labor laws: adjustments (state level) 0.69 0.84 0.00 0.00 3.00
Stringency of labor laws: disputes (state level) -0.41 1.24 0.00 -3.00 3.00
Proximity to India's ten largest cities (min driving) 446 240 396 0 1,020
Consumption per capita (2005USD at PPP) 680 186 625 352 1,397
Industrial traits - Manufacturing:
Total employment in district-industry 1,383 5,020 337 2 215,611 4,517 15,389 831 1 422,193
Start-up employment in district-industry 151 788 0 0 28,576 553 2,938 0 0 96,647
Labor market strength 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.97 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.97
Input / supplier strength -1.64 0.25 -1.69 -2.00 -0.05 -1.71 0.24 -1.76 -2.00 -0.05
Chinitz index of small suppliers 0.48 1.33 0.25 0.00 45.52 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Output / customer strength (x10 for presentation) 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 7.64 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.97
Industrial traits - Services:
Total employment in district-industry 1,761 5,892 400 3 173,293 2,885 8,145 376 1 195,863
Start-up employment in district-industry 268 1,429 0 0 47,048 502 1,581 46 0 50,243
Table 1: Local industrial conditions for Indian entrepreneurship
Unorganized sector Organized sector
Notes:  Descriptive statistics based on Annual Survey of Industries and National Sample Survey, various rounds.Base District Full Adding Using log
estimation traits estimation consumption entry count
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log of incumbent employment in district-industry 0.229+++ 0.186+++ -0.028 -0.030 0.032+
(0.043) (0.040) (0.048) (0.047) (0.018)
Log of district population 0.531+++ 0.483+++ 0.475+++ 0.482+++ 0.216+++
(0.179) (0.155) (0.156) (0.161) (0.056)
District Traits:
Log of district population density -0.569+++ -0.563+++ -0.562+++ -0.197+++
(0.088) (0.080) (0.079) (0.029)
Share of population with graduate education 0.211+ 0.235++ 0.230++ 0.078+
(0.110) (0.107) (0.111) (0.042)
Demographic dividend for district (age profiles) 0.605 0.567 0.535 0.271
(0.458) (0.446) (0.468) (0.177)
Index of infrastructure quality for district 0.018 0.096 0.086 0.015
(0.100) (0.094) (0.097) (0.038)
Strength of household banking environment 0.143 0.095 0.085 0.027
(0.104) (0.100) (0.106) (0.036)
Stringency of labor laws in district's state -0.210+++ -0.161++ -0.157++ -0.095+++
(0.070) (0.064) (0.065) (0.023)
Log travel time to closest large city -0.275+++ -0.241+++ -0.237+++ -0.091+++
(0.090) (0.083) (0.083) (0.031)
Log per capita consumption 0.152
(0.505)
Local Industrial Conditions by Incumbent Firms:
Labor market strength for district-industry 0.161 0.164 0.026
(0.102) (0.102) (0.041)
Inputs / supplier strength for district-industry 0.485+++ 0.485+++ 0.154+++
(0.098) (0.098) (0.043)
Outputs / customer strength for district-industry 0.388+++ 0.387+++ 0.167+++
(0.140) (0.140) (0.057)
Chinitz small suppliers metric for district-industry 0.279 0.279 0.337+++
(0.213) (0.212) (0.129)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4843 4843 4843 4843 4843
Adjusted R-squared 0.128 0.166 0.218 0.218 0.279
Notes: Estimations quantify the relationship between district-industry employment in new establishments and local conditions.  District-level traits are 
taken from the 2001 Census.  Industrial conditions are calculated from 2005-06 using incumbent establishments in the district-industry.  Labor 
regulations are a composite of adjustment and disputes laws.  Estimations weight observations by an interaction of district size and industry size, 
include industry fixed effects, and cluster standard errors by district.  Non-logarithm variables are transformed to have unit standard deviation for 
interpretation.
Table 2A: District entrepreneurship estimations - Organized Manufacturing
DV is log entry employment by district-industryBase District Full Adding Using log
estimation traits estimation consumption entry count
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log of incumbent employment in district-industry 0.163+++ 0.123+++ -0.075++ -0.078+++ -0.040
(0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026)
Log of district population 1.051+++ 0.878+++ 1.010+++ 1.025+++ 0.866+++
(0.161) (0.157) (0.160) (0.153) (0.138)
District Traits:
Log of district population density -0.019 -0.044 -0.042 -0.044
(0.070) (0.068) (0.073) (0.057)
Share of population with graduate education -0.002 -0.026 -0.079 -0.046
(0.080) (0.084) (0.087) (0.074)
Demographic dividend for district (age profiles) 0.954+++ 1.053+++ 0.770++ 0.798+++
(0.326) (0.330) (0.326) (0.285)
Index of infrastructure quality for district 0.386+++ 0.365+++ 0.259++ 0.325+++
(0.096) (0.097) (0.104) (0.086)
Strength of household banking environment 0.222+++ 0.211+++ 0.152+ 0.193+++
(0.080) (0.080) (0.082) (0.071)
Stringency of labor laws in district's state -0.007 0.000 0.020 0.030
(0.069) (0.069) (0.066) (0.062)
Log travel time to closest large city -0.004 0.009 0.029 0.017
(0.069) (0.074) (0.074) (0.065)
Log per capita consumption 1.191+++
(0.365)
Local Industrial Conditions by Incumbent Firms:
Labor market strength for district-industry 0.263+++ 0.271+++ 0.228+++
(0.075) (0.075) (0.067)
Inputs / supplier strength for district-industry 0.553+++ 0.542+++ 0.504+++
(0.107) (0.108) (0.096)
Outputs / customer strength for district-industry 0.291+++ 0.292+++ 0.246+++
(0.050) (0.051) (0.044)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6451 6451 6451 6451 6451
Adjusted R-squared 0.195 0.233 0.264 0.267 0.294
Table 2B: District entrepreneurship estimations - Unorganized Manufacturing
DV is log entry employment by district-industry
Notes: See Table 2A.Base District Adding Using log Base District Adding Using log
estimation traits consumption entry count estimation traits consumption entry count
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log of incumbent employment in district-industry -0.003 -0.104+++ -0.105+++ -0.054++ 0.094+++ 0.037+ 0.037+ 0.037+
(0.038) (0.033) (0.033) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Log of district population 1.278+++ 1.023+++ 1.023+++ 0.711+++ 1.213+++ 1.113+++ 1.113+++ 1.113+++
(0.148) (0.135) (0.133) (0.092) (0.107) (0.111) (0.108) (0.111)
Log of district population density -0.014 -0.013 -0.028 -0.097+ -0.096+ -0.097+
(0.086) (0.087) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057)
Share of population with graduate education 0.348+++ 0.333+++ 0.230+++ 0.179+++ 0.160++ 0.179+++
(0.085) (0.088) (0.059) (0.068) (0.070) (0.068)
Demographic dividend for district (age profiles) 0.548+ 0.469 0.329 0.574++ 0.465++ 0.574++
(0.331) (0.349) (0.230) (0.229) (0.235) (0.229)
Index of infrastructure quality for district 0.339+++ 0.315+++ 0.242+++ 0.420+++ 0.378+++ 0.420+++
(0.096) (0.106) (0.067) (0.068) (0.074) (0.068)
Strength of household banking environment 0.174++ 0.159+ 0.108+ 0.323+++ 0.302+++ 0.323+++
(0.087) (0.088) (0.060) (0.068) (0.069) (0.068)
Stringency of labor laws in district's state -0.117+ -0.112+ -0.076+ -0.154+++ -0.146+++ -0.154+++
(0.067) (0.067) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Log travel time to closest large city -0.011 -0.007 -0.021 0.048 0.056 0.048
(0.054) (0.054) (0.037) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051)
Log per capita consumption 0.295 0.454
(0.369) (0.291)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3340 3340 3340 3340 6552 6552 6552 6552
Adjusted R-squared 0.201 0.252 0.253 0.252 0.471 0.536 0.536 0.536
Table 3: District entrepreneurship estimations - Services
Notes: See Table 2A.
DV is log entry employment by district-industry
Organized Services Unorganized ServicesIncl. small One year Including 
firm share 10-19 20-39 40-99 100+ entrants lagged entry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log of incumbent employ- 0.534+++ 0.229+++ 0.277+++ 0.260+++ 0.274+++ 0.407+++ -0.082+
ment in district-industry (0.057) (0.032) (0.036) (0.045) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049)
Log of district population 0.358++ 0.192++ 0.266+++ 0.178++ 0.099 0.210 0.433+++
(0.143) (0.084) (0.075) (0.085) (0.099) (0.133) (0.152)
District Traits:
Log of district population  -0.453+++ -0.169+++ -0.160+++ -0.249+++ -0.281+++ -0.343+++ -0.521+++
density (0.069) (0.038) (0.034) (0.043) (0.062) (0.053) (0.071)
Share of population with 0.229++ 0.107+ 0.089 0.066 0.118++ 0.184++ 0.235++
graduate education (0.099) (0.060) (0.055) (0.051) (0.054) (0.086) (0.106)
Demographic dividend  0.392 0.185 0.340 0.388 0.049 0.196 0.503
for district (age profiles) (0.410) (0.255) (0.240) (0.244) (0.309) (0.335) (0.449)
Index of infrastructure  0.011 -0.017 -0.042 -0.095 -0.033 -0.104 0.082
quality for district (0.085) (0.061) (0.047) (0.058) (0.063) (0.070) (0.086)
Strength of household  0.055 -0.002 0.017 0.058 0.090 0.187+++ 0.061
banking environment (0.085) (0.049) (0.045) (0.060) (0.061) (0.070) (0.098)
Stringency of labor laws  -0.171+++ -0.094++ -0.145+++ -0.107+++ -0.036 -0.130++ -0.139++
in district's state (0.060) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.047) (0.059) (0.060)
Log travel time to  -0.183+++ -0.067 -0.064+ -0.121+++ -0.113++ -0.139++ -0.202++
closest large city (0.070) (0.041) (0.035) (0.035) (0.056) (0.054) (0.078)
Labor market strength  0.034 -0.151++ -0.004 0.048 0.195++ -0.036 0.186+
for district-industry (0.099) (0.066) (0.068) (0.074) (0.082) (0.087) (0.103)
Inputs / supplier strength 0.204++ 0.108+ 0.064 0.049 0.059 0.050 0.429+++
for district-industry (0.086) (0.056) (0.069) (0.068) (0.072) (0.076) (0.100)
Outputs / customer strength 0.230++ 0.111++ 0.159++ 0.247+++ 0.275+++ 0.235+++ 0.364+++
for district-industry (0.115) (0.053) (0.067) (0.090) (0.105) (0.088) (0.129)
Chinitz small suppliers 0.429++ 0.530+++ 0.368++ 0.150 -0.119 0.124 0.221
metric for district-industry (0.209) (0.184) (0.158) (0.155) (0.139) (0.156) (0.214)
Share of small incumbent 0.651+++ 0.447+++ 0.409+++ 0.254+++ 0.055 0.169+++
firms in the district-industry (0.115) (0.060) (0.068) (0.072) (0.085) (0.034)
Lagged organized mfg entry 0.205+++
rate for district-industry (0.026)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4843 4843 4843 4843 4843 4843 4843
Adjusted R-squared 0.169 0.179 0.192 0.196 0.197 0.246 0.245
Table 4: Extended district entrepreneurship estimations - Organized Manufacturing
Entering establishment employment of:
DV is log entry employment by district-industry indicated in column header
Local Industrial Conditions by Incumbent Firms:
Notes: See Table 2a. Column 7 includes an unreported dummy variable for zero entry in the lagged period.India as a whole District-level 
mean
District-level 
stand. deviation
India as a whole District-level 
mean
District-level 
stand. deviation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0-4 employees 59.11% 68.80% 26.85% 92.18% 92.79% 11.35%
5-9 employees 16.57% 10.46% 15.00% 5.83% 4.76% 9.67%
10-19 employees 8.85% 6.15% 10.15% 1.57% 1.65% 4.01%
20-39 employees 2.11% 2.34% 4.33% 0.18% 0.31% 0.78%
40-99 employees 3.83% 4.46% 8.82% 0.14% 0.33% 1.43%
100+ employees 9.52% 7.80% 14.01% 0.09% 0.16% 0.49%
10-19 employees 36.42% 33.55% 32.63% 79.33% 57.81% 32.35%
20-39 employees 8.69% 14.39% 21.04% 9.18% 18.28% 22.00%
40-99 employees 15.74% 18.76% 23.30% 7.16% 14.69% 19.87%
100+ employees 39.15% 27.37% 29.93% 4.33% 9.23% 16.40%
Table 5: Distribution of entrant employments and plant counts across size categories
Notes: Table documents the distribution of entrant employments and establishment counts across the establishment size distribution. The first and fourth 
columns provide statistics for India as a whole. The district mean and standard deviation columns summarize the unweighted variation at the district level.
Employment in entering establishments Counts of entering establishments
B. Organized sector only of manufacturing
A. Organized and unorganized sectors of manufacturingUnpublished Appendix 
App. Table 1 documents our data sources and years for each variable. For the infrastructure 
index, the underlying components are not reported in the Census data for six districts (major 
cities) that are not further subdivided into separate geographic units. In these cases we assign the 
infrastructure access components as 100%, and our results are robust to excluding these cities 
instead. The ten largest cities for the travel time calculations are Ahmedabad, Bangalore, 
Bhubaneshwar, Chennai, Delhi, Guwahati, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Patna. 
We note in the text that the input metric is mostly orthogonal to district size. The metric is not 
perfectly orthogonal to district size to the degree to which larger districts have more independent 
economic zones than smaller zones. Thus, even if the very localized input conditions within a 
small and large district are similar for a start-up, the measured quality of input conditions will be 
less in the larger district as the input metric will sum over more economic zones. We thank Juan 
Alcacer for pointing this out. The output measure also carries with it some residual dependencies 
on district size.  
App. Tables 2A-3B provide descriptive statistics by state. App. Table 2A describes the organized 
manufacturing sector. There are just over 14,000 young establishments in India’s organized 
manufacturing sector in 2005. This reflects an entry rate of approximately 15%, using a weighted 
average across states, which varies spatially to a large degree. Among the larger states in terms 
of manufacturing employment, entry rates are highest in Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, and 
Karnataka at 18%-22%. Within Uttar Pradesh, the most entrepreneurial districts (on this relative 
scale) are Dehradun, Fatehpur, Faizabad, and Nagar Hardwar. The most entrepreneurial districts 
in Karnataka are Bangalore-Rural, Tumkur, Bangalore-Urban, and Dakshina Kannada. While 
possessing smaller manufacturing bases, entry rates are also high in Himachal Pradesh and 
Orissa. The spatial variation in entry rates across states is of similar magnitude to the regional 
variation evident in advanced economies (e.g., Reynolds et al. 2007). 
The unorganized manufacturing sector in App. Table 2B has far more new establishments in any 
given year—almost 1.9 million in 2005 for our sample—although the entry rate at 12% is lower 
than the organized sector. There is negative correlation of -0.2 between spatial entry rates for 
organized and unorganized sectors across states. High rates of unorganized entry are found in 
Delhi, Haryana, Kerala, and Pondicherry, while Bihar, Karnataka, and Orissa have among the 
lowest rates. These contrasts are even starker when using self-employment measures: for the 
fifteen districts with self-employment accounting for greater than 50% of total district 
employment, none have an organized sector entry rate above 5%. 
In the organized services sector document in App. Table 3A, there are about 120,000 young 
establishments in 2001, representing an entry rate of 20%. The highest rates are evident in 
Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, with a number of other states closely following with entry rates 
of 20%-25%. Gujarat has the lowest entry rate. State-level entry rates for organized services have a 0.4 correlation to those in organized manufacturing. The largest entry levels in absolute terms 
occur in the unorganized services sector documented in App. Table 3B, with over 2.2 million 
establishments at a rate of 17%. Entry rates are particularly high in Kerala and Haryana. 
Unorganized and organized activities are more closely linked in services than in manufacturing 
with a spatial correlation across states of 0.3 for services. 
App. Tables 4 and 5 provide some key robustness checks for the organized and unorganized 
sectors, respectively. We repeat the full estimation for easy reference. We then show that the 
results are very similar without the sample weights. Our labor regulations metric varies across 
states, rather than districts, and so we show its precision (as well as the other variables) is robust 
to clustering standard errors by state. We then include the shares of the district population that 
are Hindu, Muslim, Christian, and Sikh as controls. Finally, we include the female population 
share as a control. Across these specifications, our reported results hold well, and we discuss in 
the main text some of the other controls we considered. 
App. Tables 6 and 7 report conditional estimations that focus just on district-industry variation. 
App. Table 6 estimates a conditional specification of the form, 
ln(Entrydi) = ηi + δd + γ∙ln(Incumbent Employmentdi) + γI∙Inputdi + γO∙Outputdi  
+ γL∙Labordi + γC∙Chinitzdi + εdi. 
We now include a vector of district fixed effects δd that control for differences across districts 
that are common for all industries, for example Delhi’s larger size. Specifications thus employ 
variation within districts and industries: How much of the unexplained district-industry variation 
in entrepreneurship can we explain through incumbent local conditions that are especially 
suitable for particular industries? 
The first three columns are for the organized manufacturing sector, while the last two columns 
are for the unorganized manufacturing sector. We report robust standard errors reflecting the 
district-industry variation. The coefficient patterns are stronger and more precisely estimated 
than those in the unconditional estimations reported in the main text. These results suggest that 
many of the agglomeration forces operate as strongly for entrants in India as they do in advanced 
economies, or perhaps even more strongly. We interpret the weaker performance in the paper’s 
unconditional estimates, compared to these conditional estimates that fully control for district 
averages, as further evidence that India’s economic geography is not set to the degree that an 
advanced economy is. 
In addition to these conditional tests of our agglomeration metrics, unreported estimations 
confirm some of the district traits analyzed through interaction regressions. After including the 
district effects, we can no longer estimate the direct impact of labor laws on entry rates, but we 
can estimate an interaction of labor laws with how important labor is as an input factor for an 
industry. We estimate the latter importance through the industry’s wage bill divided by industry 
value added. This interaction is negative and statistically significant, indicating that entrepreneurship in labor-intensive sectors is disproportionately reduced by strict labor laws 
(similar conclusions are reached using employment-based measures). We likewise find that the 
Chinitz effect and local input conditions matter more in materially intensive industries.
1 
App. Table 7 examines the entrant size distribution for the organized sector by separating our 
overall entry measures into establishment sizes of young firms. The entry of a ten-person 
establishment is presumably a different phenomenon than the entry of a new firm with hundreds 
of employees. We care more about larger entrants in certain contexts, for example when 
worrying about the determinants of robust local labor demand. On the other hand, the entry of 
small establishments may be a purer reflection of entrepreneurship and hence more intrinsically 
interesting. More generally, empirical evidence exists that small and large establishments 
agglomerate differently (e.g., Holmes and Stevens 2002, Duranton and Overman 2008), and it is 
useful to extend this description to entering firms.
2 
App. Table 7 finds interesting distributional effects that also provide intuitive confirmation of the 
economic forces proposed. Most strikingly, the importance of the Chinitz effect is concentrated 
among small entrants, similar to the main text, while the importance of overall output markets 
and labor spillovers grow with entrant size. For India, it appears that input cost factors are more 
influential in the location choices of small start-ups, while output conditions and labor markets 
are more important for large entrants. 
App. Table 8 contains our final set of empirical results. Our work thus far has focused on the 
cross-sectional patterns of incumbent industrial structures and entry. By including district and 
industry fixed effects, we focus on within-district and within-industry variation for analysis. This 
approach thus guards against omitted factors that vary by district or by industry. Similarly, our 
focus on incumbent firms to explain new entrants mirrors Jofre-Monseny et al. (2011), taking the 
former to be pre-determined. As an alternative, Glaeser and Kerr (2009) use predicted spatial 
distributions of industries due to natural cost advantages to provide a measure of exogeneity. 
Nonetheless, a concern persists that there are unique aspects of district-industries that may 
confound this relationship. To take a United States example, the automobile industry has been 
concentrated in Detroit for over a century. Over this span of time, localized entrepreneurship and 
                                                 
1 As another robustness check on our metric design, we find similar results when winsorizing our metrics at 
their 5% and 95% levels to weaken the influence of extreme values. The main adjustment is that the output metric 
grows in relative importance.   
2 A second rationale exists for examining the entry size distribution. Better local conditions may foster a 
larger entry size for entrepreneurs due to factors like less uncertainty about local growth potential and faster 
assembly of key resources. However, metrics of average entry size confound this intensive margin adjustment with 
changes in the extensive margin of greater entry rates. Better local conditions may simultaneously foster greater 
entry by many small firms, which leads to an overall decline in average entry size. We feel it is more prudent to look 
at the distribution measure. incumbent industrial structures will have jointly influenced each other, and many other factors 
that we do not model may have arisen (e.g., special political connections and support by Detroit 
for the automobile industry). These latter factors that are particular to an industrial cluster would 
not be captured by city and industry fixed effects, and yet these instances of highly agglomerated 
activity are very important for identification in the above estimations. The long history of the 
Indian government’s involvement in local industrial policy accentuates these econometric 
concerns for our estimates.  
One approach to help address these concerns is to use time-varying conditions in localized 
agglomeration and entry by district-industry. By looking across two points in time, district-
industry fixed effects can be included in the estimations. These fixed effects control for long-run 
levels of incumbent industrial structures and entry, focusing on changes within each district-
industry. Such an approach does not fully overcome potential biases, as there could be time-
varying factors within district-industries that continue to confound the analysis. The empirical 
bar, however, is set much higher. 
 A challenge to implementing this approach in many settings is that industrial structures can be 
very stable over time, providing little variation to exploit. India’s organized manufacturing 
setting provides a unique opportunity in this regard. Prior to the large-scale deregulations, spatial 
location decisions for firms were set to a large degree by the government, with the goal to 
promote general equality across regions. In the two decades since these restrictions were lifted, 
India’s manufacturing has seen large changes in spatial locations and agglomerations (e.g., 
Fernandes and Sharma 2011).  
These changes provide much greater longitudinal variation than could typically be exploited. 
Micro-data for India’s organized manufacturing sector extend back to 1989. We prepare our 
metrics for 1989 similar to those used in 2005. We restrict our sample to district-industry 
observations present in both periods. App. Table 8 estimates a panel specification of the form: 
ln(Entrydit) = ηit + δdt + πdi + γ∙ln(Incumbent Employmentdit) + γI∙Inputdit + γO∙Outputdit  
+ γL∙Labordit + εdit. 
We now include a vector of district-industry fixed effects πdi that control for fixed differences 
across district-industries; we also extend our earlier fixed effects to be district-year and industry-
year controls. These specifications thus employ panel variation: how much of the growth in 
district-industry entrepreneurship can we explain through changes in incumbent local conditions 
that are especially suitable for particular industries? By including district-year and industry-year 
fixed effects, we measure this effect after controlling for general district and industry 
development between 1989 and 2005. 
App. Table 8 provides strong confirmation for our basic findings. In the first column, growth in 
general incumbent employment over the 16 years is linked to higher entrepreneurship. The 
elasticity is half the size estimated in the cross-section work. The elasticity decline may indicate that an upward bias existed in the cross-sectional estimations (e.g., due to an omitted factor), but 
is also possible that the differencing exacerbated measurement error and its downward bias. In 
the second column, we also find support for the Marshallian metrics related to input and output 
markets. The coefficients are slightly larger than in the cross-sectional estimations and precisely 
estimated. Interestingly, labor conditions do not find support in the panel setting.
3 Changes in the 
Chinitz metric yielded implausibly large coefficients values due to outliers, and we do not report 
them. Of our metrics, the Chinitz effect is the most sensitive due to how it embodies both the 
establishment size distribution and input-output exchanges. Its sensitivity is thus not very 
surprising. 
Overall, the panel estimations support our core evidence on the link between entrepreneurship 
and local industrial conditions in India. We think that India’s industrial past, and the 
government-led spatial allocation of industrial activity that is rapidly becoming undone, provides 
a very interesting laboratory for testing many features of agglomeration and urban economics 
that are difficult to disentangle in advanced economies with more stable economic geographies.  
 
                                                 
3 One potential factor that may contribute to the greater sensitivity of the labor metric compared to input-
output measures is that the labor metric builds upon worker flows in the United States which may differ 
substantially from India. The input-output metrics, by contrast, directly build upon India’s input-output tables. Variable Data source Year
Organized manufacturing entry and incumbent structures data GOI Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation 
Annual Survey of Industries 2005-2006
2005-06
GOI Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation 
Annual Survey of Industries 1989-1990
1989-90
Unorganized manufacturing entry and incumbent structures data GOI National Sample Survey Organisation, Socio-
Economic Survey 62nd Round: July 2005 – June 2006, 
Schedule 2.2: Manufacturing Enterprises
2005-06
Services entry and incumbent structures data GOI National Sample Survey Organisation, Socio-
Economic Survey 57th Round: July 2001 - June 2002, 
Schedule 2.345: Unorganised Services
2001-02
District population Census of India, District-level tabulations 2001
District population density (persons per sq. km.) Census of India, District-level tabulations 2001
Share of population with a graduate education Census of India, District-level tabulations 2001
Demographic divided for a district (age profile) Census of India, District-level tabulations 2001
Index of infrastructure quality for district Census of India, District-level tabulations 2001
Strength of household banking environment Census of India, District-level tabulations 2001
Stringency of labor adjustment laws for district's state  Ahsan & Pages (2009) 2001
Stringency of labor disputes laws for district's state  Ahsan & Pages (2009) 2001
Travel time to closest of 10 largest cities (by population), in driving minutes Authors' calculation n/a
Consumption per capita (2005USD at purchasing power parity) GOI National Sample Survey Organisation, Socio-
Economic Survey 55th Round: July 1999 – June 2000, 
Household Schedule 10: Employment and Unemployment
1999
App. Table 1: Data sources and yearsNumber of 
districts in 
sample
Number of 
establishments
Number of new 
establishments 
(<3 years old)
Number of 
persons engaged
Number of 
persons engaged 
in new establ.
Share of 
establishments 
that are new
Share of 
employment in 
new establ.
Andhra Pradesh 23 9,835 2,032 813,062 65,373 21% 8%
Bihar 39 2,396 510 137,875 19,121 21% 14%
Chandigarh 1 242 12 8,747 327 5% 4%
Delhi 1 2,413 158 109,699 9,225 7% 8%
Goa 2 472 65 34,798 2,448 14% 7%
Gujarat 18 11,216 1,428 697,196 83,337 13% 12%
Haryana 16 3,772 279 354,229 35,713 7% 10%
Himachal Pradesh 11 691 261 52,120 17,391 38% 33%
Karnataka 17 5,401 981 459,946 80,582 18% 18%
Kerala 14 3,622 300 245,274 11,891 8% 5%
Madhya Pradesh 44 3,325 419 242,135 20,745 13% 9%
Maharashtra 30 14,058 1,749 1,035,176 101,400 12% 10%
Orissa 13 1,498 354 104,619 23,484 24% 22%
Pondicherry 4 480 108 37,516 5,007 22% 13%
Punjab 10 7,302 616 410,178 27,099 8% 7%
Rajasthan 26 4,865 731 257,648 28,570 15% 11%
Tamil Nadu 21 12,834 1,902 1,032,308 100,686 15% 10%
Uttar Pradesh 58 9,126 1,989 636,359 112,996 22% 18%
West Bengal 17 4,847 403 440,758 28,467 8% 6%
Notes:  Descriptive statistics based on Annual Survey of Industries and National Sample Survey, various rounds.  State-level traits are calculated over districts included in 
estimation samples.
App. Table 2A: Summary statistics for Organized Manufacturing (2005-06)Number of 
districts in 
sample
Number of 
establishments
Number of new 
establishments 
(<3 years old)
Number of 
persons engaged
Number of 
persons engaged 
in new establ.
Share of 
establishments 
that are new
Share of 
employment in 
new establ.
Andhra Pradesh 23 1,429,916 150,789 2,582,039 233,198 11% 9%
Bihar 39 1,304,917 60,122 2,082,220 101,453 5% 5%
Chandigarh 1 1,318 175 2,427 189 13% 8%
Delhi 1 97,424 27,483 448,017 152,965 28% 34%
Goa 2 10,132 775 25,575 1,845 8% 7%
Gujarat 18 637,662 106,278 1,384,543 215,246 17% 16%
Haryana 16 224,098 46,957 481,043 87,316 21% 18%
Himachal Pradesh 11 102,675 16,056 135,317 22,944 16% 17%
Karnataka 17 937,626 57,736 1,798,046 114,712 6% 6%
Kerala 14 569,116 103,104 1,092,465 220,759 18% 20%
Madhya Pradesh 44 1,017,799 85,875 1,852,854 156,109 8% 8%
Maharashtra 30 1,105,928 156,352 2,505,209 376,932 14% 15%
Orissa 13 830,361 40,010 1,435,721 64,572 5% 4%
Pondicherry 4 13,328 3,451 40,641 12,906 26% 32%
Punjab 10 284,890 32,573 547,420 59,377 11% 11%
Rajasthan 26 605,522 68,804 1,029,463 119,245 11% 12%
Tamil Nadu 21 1,454,360 192,973 3,052,908 429,085 13% 14%
Uttar Pradesh 58 2,250,792 393,130 4,418,741 738,044 17% 17%
West Bengal 17 2,689,853 353,045 4,742,212 533,644 13% 11%
App. Table 2B: Summary statistics for Unorganized Manufacturing (2005-06)
Notes:  See App. Table 2A.Number of 
districts in 
sample
Number of 
establishments
Number of new 
establishments 
(<3 years old)
Number of 
persons engaged
Number of 
persons engaged 
in new establ.
Share of 
establishments 
that are new
Share of 
employment in 
new establ.
Andhra Pradesh 23 50,203 16,649 472,339 115,668 33% 24%
Bihar 39 24,335 2,426 186,560 15,992 10% 9%
Chandigarh 1 1,951 233 18,528 2,315 12% 12%
Delhi 1 22,471 3,278 232,993 23,766 15% 10%
Goa 2 1,250 262 12,622 2,150 21% 17%
Gujarat 17 42,785 3,275 536,731 24,907 8% 5%
Haryana 16 13,366 2,614 149,652 19,345 20% 13%
Himachal Pradesh 12 2,623 563 25,317 3,731 21% 15%
Karnataka 17 42,364 11,963 386,475 72,577 28% 19%
Kerala 14 34,709 7,037 361,322 55,934 20% 15%
Madhya Pradesh 44 38,538 5,548 374,968 43,684 14% 12%
Maharashtra 30 90,819 19,160 869,617 160,806 21% 18%
Orissa 13 18,178 4,200 148,874 27,274 23% 18%
Pondicherry 4 2,762 669 29,876 7,527 24% 25%
Punjab 10 14,438 3,463 185,046 29,020 24% 16%
Rajasthan 26 26,970 6,491 244,282 48,074 24% 20%
Tamil Nadu 21 48,190 7,841 548,315 59,680 16% 11%
Uttar Pradesh 58 103,267 20,564 897,253 171,210 20% 19%
West Bengal 17 35,660 4,445 382,695 38,626 12% 10%
App. Table 3A: Summary statistics for Organized Services (2001-02)
Notes:  See App. Table 2A.Number of 
districts in 
sample
Number of 
establishments
Number of new 
establishments 
(<3 years old)
Number of 
persons engaged
Number of 
persons engaged 
in new establ.
Share of 
establishments 
that are new
Share of 
employment in 
new establ.
Andhra Pradesh 23 1,283,845 227,385 2,056,671 352,485 18% 17%
Bihar 39 1,433,440 69,281 2,010,992 98,044 5% 5%
Chandigarh 1 16,092 3,731 25,496 5,607 23% 22%
Delhi 1 224,651 57,135 372,375 93,097 25% 25%
Goa 2 12,705 3,222 22,494 5,223 25% 23%
Gujarat 17 556,165 85,688 779,596 122,316 15% 16%
Haryana 16 208,836 61,600 299,033 85,968 29% 29%
Himachal Pradesh 12 77,258 24,386 116,024 36,810 32% 32%
Karnataka 17 633,884 121,182 996,150 200,301 19% 20%
Kerala 14 560,170 179,377 833,808 272,035 32% 33%
Madhya Pradesh 44 567,032 87,800 872,027 143,214 15% 16%
Maharashtra 30 1,094,885 252,756 1,732,570 416,709 23% 24%
Orissa 13 593,974 66,535 997,465 100,347 11% 10%
Pondicherry 4 16,095 3,887 32,017 8,068 24% 25%
Punjab 10 343,779 81,993 474,572 117,711 24% 25%
Rajasthan 26 514,407 107,974 748,729 161,132 21% 22%
Tamil Nadu 21 962,148 176,200 1,575,196 301,720 18% 19%
Uttar Pradesh 58 2,472,139 446,279 3,448,423 663,916 18% 19%
West Bengal 17 1,524,382 166,715 1,939,358 216,087 11% 11%
App. Table 3B: Summary statistics for Unorganized Services (2001-02)
Notes:  See App. Table 2A.Manufacturing Services
Full No Clustering  Incl. religion Incl. female Full No Clustering  Incl. religion Incl. female
estimation weights by state controls pop share estimation weights by state controls pop share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log of incumbent employment in district-industry -0.028 -0.075++ -0.028 -0.027 -0.033 -0.104+++ -0.098+++ -0.104+++ -0.104+++ -0.104+++
(0.048) (0.038) (0.037) (0.047) (0.048) (0.033) (0.028) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033)
Log of district population 0.475+++ 0.414+++ 0.475++ 0.442+++ 0.461+++ 1.023+++ 0.914+++ 1.023+++ 1.030+++ 1.011+++
(0.156) (0.137) (0.187) (0.166) (0.160) (0.135) (0.121) (0.149) (0.139) (0.136)
District Traits:
Log of district population density -0.563+++ -0.493+++ -0.563+++ -0.548+++ -0.561+++ -0.014 0.019 -0.014 -0.012 -0.015
(0.080) (0.087) (0.090) (0.079) (0.087) (0.086) (0.084) (0.098) (0.086) (0.083)
Share of population with graduate education 0.235++ 0.208++ 0.235+ 0.214+ 0.163 0.348+++ 0.299+++ 0.348+++ 0.346+++ 0.311+++
(0.107) (0.096) (0.120) (0.109) (0.111) (0.085) (0.081) (0.054) (0.083) (0.087)
Demographic dividend for district (age profiles) 0.567 0.441 0.567 0.930+ 0.931++ 0.548+ 0.534+ 0.548+ 0.536 0.698+
(0.446) (0.393) (0.481) (0.550) (0.440) (0.331) (0.288) (0.285) (0.405) (0.365)
Index of infrastructure quality for district 0.096 0.111 0.096 0.082 0.066 0.339+++ 0.297+++ 0.339++ 0.331+++ 0.327+++
(0.094) (0.083) (0.107) (0.097) (0.092) (0.096) (0.080) (0.122) (0.102) (0.098)
Strength of household banking environment 0.095 0.070 0.095 0.137 0.075 0.174++ 0.173++ 0.174++ 0.173++ 0.176++
(0.100) (0.089) (0.144) (0.099) (0.098) (0.087) (0.078) (0.082) (0.088) (0.087)
Stringency of labor laws in district's state -0.161++ -0.139++ -0.161++ -0.198+++ -0.184+++ -0.117+ -0.118++ -0.117+ -0.114 -0.131+
(0.064) (0.056) (0.061) (0.060) (0.062) (0.067) (0.058) (0.065) (0.074) (0.068)
Log travel time to closest large city -0.241+++ -0.225++ -0.241++ -0.212++ -0.216++ -0.011 -0.003 -0.011 -0.014 -0.002
(0.083) (0.087) (0.099) (0.087) (0.083) (0.054) (0.053) (0.043) (0.055) (0.055)
Local Industrial Conditions by Incumbent Firms:
Labor market strength for district-industry 0.161 0.149 0.161+ 0.170+ 0.171+
(0.102) (0.094) (0.085) (0.100) (0.102)
Inputs / supplier strength for district-industry 0.485+++ 0.563+++ 0.485+++ 0.484+++ 0.487+++
(0.098) (0.088) (0.074) (0.097) (0.098)
Outputs / customer strength for district-industry 0.388+++ 0.434+++ 0.388+++ 0.383+++ 0.379+++
(0.140) (0.148) (0.130) (0.140) (0.137)
Chinitz small suppliers metric for district-industry 0.279 0.139 0.279 0.278 0.259
(0.213) (0.176) (0.214) (0.212) (0.212)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4843 4843 4843 4843 4843 3340 3340 3340 3340 3340
Adjusted R-squared 0.218 0.194 0.218 0.220 0.220 0.252 0.240 0.252 0.252 0.253
App. Table 4: Robustness checks on district entrepreneurship estimations - Organized Manufacturing and Services
DV is log entry employment by district-industry
Notes: Robustness checks on Table 2A and Table 3.Manufacturing Services
Full No Clustering  Incl. religion Incl. female Full No Clustering  Incl. religion Incl. female
estimation weights by state controls pop share estimation weights by state controls pop share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log of incumbent employment in district-industry -0.075++ -0.053++ -0.053+ -0.081+++ -0.073++ 0.037+ 0.047+++ 0.037+ 0.039+ 0.037+
(0.029) (0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020)
Log of district population 1.010+++ 0.853+++ 0.853+++ 0.942+++ 1.004+++ 1.113+++ 0.977+++ 1.113+++ 1.101+++ 1.112+++
(0.160) (0.131) (0.138) (0.164) (0.160) (0.111) (0.100) (0.099) (0.113) (0.111)
District Traits:
Log of district population density -0.044 -0.055 -0.055 -0.065 -0.045 -0.097+ -0.067 -0.097 -0.093 -0.097+
(0.068) (0.065) (0.076) (0.073) (0.064) (0.057) (0.060) (0.069) (0.057) (0.057)
Share of population with graduate education -0.026 -0.019 -0.019 0.035 -0.091 0.179+++ 0.170+++ 0.179++ 0.171++ 0.177++
(0.084) (0.073) (0.088) (0.086) (0.087) (0.068) (0.065) (0.079) (0.068) (0.072)
Demographic dividend for district (age profiles) 1.053+++ 0.942+++ 0.942+ 1.006+++ 1.359+++ 0.574++ 0.533++ 0.574+ 0.699+++ 0.585++
(0.330) (0.286) (0.468) (0.365) (0.348) (0.229) (0.214) (0.329) (0.257) (0.281)
Index of infrastructure quality for district 0.365+++ 0.313+++ 0.313+ 0.388+++ 0.339+++ 0.420+++ 0.391+++ 0.420+++ 0.405+++ 0.419+++
(0.097) (0.083) (0.153) (0.100) (0.097) (0.068) (0.061) (0.093) (0.071) (0.068)
Strength of household banking environment 0.211+++ 0.194+++ 0.194++ 0.161+ 0.216+++ 0.323+++ 0.299+++ 0.323+++ 0.331+++ 0.323+++
(0.080) (0.072) (0.082) (0.084) (0.080) (0.068) (0.065) (0.082) (0.071) (0.068)
Stringency of labor laws in district's state 0.000 -0.029 -0.029 0.008 -0.019 -0.154+++ -0.146+++ -0.154+++ -0.168+++ -0.154+++
(0.069) (0.059) (0.097) (0.071) (0.071) (0.048) (0.044) (0.034) (0.052) (0.048)
Log travel time to closest large city 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.021 0.028 0.048 0.056 0.048 0.053 0.049
(0.074) (0.066) (0.098) (0.074) (0.074) (0.051) (0.047) (0.056) (0.052) (0.053)
Local Industrial Conditions by Incumbent Firms:
Labor market strength for district-industry 0.263+++ 0.213+++ 0.213++ 0.262+++ 0.266+++
(0.075) (0.066) (0.090) (0.075) (0.075)
Inputs / supplier strength for district-industry 0.553+++ 0.652+++ 0.652+++ 0.579+++ 0.543+++
(0.107) (0.097) (0.114) (0.107) (0.107)
Outputs / customer strength for district-industry 0.291+++ 0.264+++ 0.264+++ 0.287+++ 0.284+++
(0.050) (0.055) (0.069) (0.051) (0.050)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6451 6458 6458 6458 6458 6552 6557 6552 6552 6552
Adjusted R-squared 0.264 0.252 0.252 0.269 0.265 0.536 0.523 0.536 0.536 0.536
DV is log entry employment by district-industry
Notes: Robustness checks on Table 2B and Table 3.
App. Table 5: Robustness checks on district entrepreneurship estimations - Unorganized Manufacturing and ServicesBase Including  Including  Base Including 
estimation Marshallian Chinitz estimation Marshallian
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log of incumbent employment in district-industry 0.155+++ -0.064++ -0.063++ 0.109+++ -0.100+++
(0.025) (0.031) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026)
Labor market strength for district-industry 0.515+++ 0.496+++ 0.370+++
(0.089) (0.089) (0.066)
Inputs / supplier strength for district-industry 0.344+++ 0.263+++ 0.448+++
(0.080) (0.088) (0.108)
Outputs / customer strength for district-industry 0.291+++ 0.304+++ 0.264+++
(0.113) (0.111) (0.045)
Chinitz small suppliers metric for district-industry 0.597+++
(0.203)
District and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4843 4843 4843 6451 6451
Adjusted R-squared 0.259 0.306 0.309 0.308 0.340
App. Table 6: Conditional entrepreneurship estimations - Manufacturing
Organized Manufacturing Unorg. Manufacturing
DV is log entry employment by district-industry
Notes: See Table 2A.  Estimations consider entry patterns conditional on industry and district fixed effects.10-19 20-39 40-99 100+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of incumbent employment in district-industry 0.038++ 0.062+++ 0.048++ 0.024
(0.016) (0.019) (0.022) (0.027)
Labor market strength for district-industry -0.002 0.134++ 0.218+++ 0.447+++
(0.055) (0.066) (0.071) (0.087)
Inputs / supplier strength for district-industry 0.106+ 0.127++ 0.115+ 0.046
(0.055) (0.063) (0.069) (0.080)
Outputs / customer strength for district-industry 0.142+++ 0.160++ 0.226+++ 0.277+++
(0.051) (0.064) (0.079) (0.091)
Chinitz small suppliers metric for district-industry 0.598+++ 0.384++ 0.108 -0.028
(0.167) (0.153) (0.138) (0.138)
District and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4843 4843 4843 4843
Adjusted R-squared 0.190 0.188 0.194 0.219
Notes: See Table 2A and App. Table 6.  Estimations disaggregate entry into an entry size distribution based upon initial 
employment in the establishment.
Entering establishment employment of:
DV is log entry employment by district-industry
App. Table 7: Entry size distribution estimations - ManufacturingBase Including 
estimation Marshallian
(1) (2)
Log of incumbent employment in district-industry 0.068++ -0.083++
(0.033) (0.036)
Labor market strength for district-industry -0.085
(0.127)
Inputs / supplier strength for district-industry 0.428+++
(0.124)
Outputs / customer strength for district-industry 0.495+++
(0.087)
District-industry, district-year, and industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 5848 5848
Adjusted R-squared 0.269 0.292
App. Table 8: Entrepreneurship estimations using changes from 1989 to 2005
DV is log entry empl.
Notes: See Table 2A and App. Table 6.  Estimations consider changes in incumbent industrial conditions and entrepreneurship 
from 1989 to 2005 for the organized manufacturing sector.